Corporate governance transparency in small listed entities : the case of Malta by Baldacchino, Peter J. et al.
 European Research Studies Journal 
Volume XXIII, Issue 2, 2020 
                                                                                                                                      pp. 23-44 
Corporate Governance Transparency in Small Listed Entities: 
The Case of Malta*   
 Submitted 20/12/19, 1st revision 25/01/20, 2nd revision 21/02/20 accepted 30/03/20   
 
 Peter J. Baldacchino1, Nirvana Duca2, Norbert Tabone3,   
Simon Grima4 
Abstract: 
 
Purpose: The objectives of this study are to examine whether a lack of transparency is a 
common corporate governance feature of listed entities (“MLEs”) in the small European 
state of Malta and, if so, to assess the possible implications of such a stance. 
Design/Approach/Methodology: In order to achieve such research objectives, a 
predominantly qualitative mixed methodology was adopted. This involved carrying out 
thirteen semi-structured interviews with MLE and audit firm representatives, these being 
supported by an examination of the corporate governance statements of MLEs for the 2015-
2017 periods.  
Findings: Results show a general lack of transparency in corporate governance reporting, 
with a common MLE tendency to comply only at a superficial level with the principles of 
good corporate governance and thus to often fail to sustain an appropriate level of 
transparency and governance structures.  
Practical Implications: It is recomended to increase company and shareholder awareness so 
as to help towards further improving current attitudes.  
Originality/Value: The study is particularly envisaged to contribute towards encouraging 
stakeholders in small-state contexts to reassess their current perspectives towards corporate 
transparency.  
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1. Introduction 
 
As a consequence of the global financial crisis and the demise of several well-known 
businesses such as Enron and Worldcom, for which frail corporate governance (CG) 
has been considered a causal element, a global awareness regarding efficient and 
effective CG has been revitalized (Khancel, 2007). Generally, CG is defined as “the 
system by which companies are directed and controlled” (Cadbury Report, 1992, p. 
14). CG sets forth the relationship between the shareholders who own the entity, 
having an honest interest in the doings of the business, and the directors who are in 
charge of the entity’s assets and also mitigates the conflicts of interest which may 
arise between the two (Cadbury Report, 1992). CG is a mechanism which protects 
shareholder’s interest by virtue of proper practices and structures. 
 
Calder (2008) claims that a sound CG framework is one which must evolve around 
three essential aspects of accountability, shareholder rights and transparency. In fact, 
the latter is nowadays generally considered to be the tool which mitigates distressed 
relationships between a company and its stakeholders through its perceived ability to 
create, maintain and repair trust issues (Fombrun and Rindova, 2000). In this 
context, the EU’s Transparency Directive specifies that the disclosure of proper 
information maintains investor confidence, market efficiency and investor protection 
(European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, 2013). Additionally, 
all existing CG frameworks adopt the comply-or-explain approach (CoE) except for 
the United States framework which adopts a rules-based approach. In this regard, 
Inwinkl et al. (2014) argues that the application of the CoE approach can only be 
successful if supported by high end and transparent reporting. 
 
Notwithstanding the heightened awareness and improvement in CG during the last 
two decades, it is evident that several companies are still finding it challenging to 
entrench CG in their company culture and they tend to comply simply with the letter 
of the law and not with its spirit (Arcot et al., 2010). Non-compliance with CG codes 
is still considered to be a persistent matter. Moreover, some companies are 
somewhat reluctant to provide adequate and substantial disclosure. They tend to 
cling to corporate confidentiality whilst hampering Corporate Transparency (CT). 
These concerns are also apparent in Malta. Both Azzopardi (2012) and Baldacchino 
et al. (2020) highlight the fact that MLEs do not provide adequate explanations as a 
justification for their non-compliance. Azzopardi (2012), also proves that the 
evaluation of the board of company is one of the weakest aspects of CG with 
companies claiming the unnecessity of such evaluation. Additionally, Bezzina et al. 
(2014) identified the disclosures of remuneration packages as one of the aspects of 
non-adherence by Maltese listed entities (MLEs) and areas of potential 
improvement. 
 
In Malta, a number of recent studies addressing CG have been carried out. However, 
none of these has considered the possible linkage between CG and CT. Thus, the 
main objectives of this paper are to examine whether a lack of corporate 
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transparency is a relevant feature in the corporate governance of MLEs and, if so, to 
assess the possible reasons for such a corporate stance and its implications.  
 
2. Literature Review 
 
2.1 Corporate Governance in Malta 
 
The emergence of CG in Malta traces back to 2001, when the Working Group set up 
by the Malta Stock Exchange was asked to give advice on matters relating to CG. 
One of the main recommendations was to establish a code of CG practices in order 
to enrich the quality as well as the transparency of corporate management.  In 
response, the MFSA drafted the 'Code of Good Corporate Governance' and this has 
since then formed part of the Listing Rules (2018).  
 
The proposed code was then revised in 2005 by the MFSA as a consequence of the 
international pressures on the concept of CG. The MFSA made some of its 
provisions mandatory such as the formation of an audit committee, the separation 
between the roles of the chairman and the chief executive and the inclusion of non-
executive directors (NEDs) on the board (MFSA, 2005). Another revision was 
conducted in 2010 renaming the code as ‘The Code of Principles of Good Corporate 
Governance for Listed Entities’ (the Code), and dividing the Code into 12 main 
principles, supporting principles and provisions. The applicability of this Code was 
extended to include all listed companies, banks, trusts, finance companies but 
excluding collective investment schemes (Grima et al., 2017; Grima and 
Thalassinos, 2020; Thalassinos et al., 2015a; 2015b).  
 
It is reasonable to say that the Code and all revisions followed developments that 
occurred within the United Kingdom (UK). Similar to the UK’s Codes, the Code is 
based on the CoE approach, where entities are encouraged to comply with all the 
principles but if unable to do so an explanation is required (Bezzina et al., 2014). In 
fact, the Code (2011) requires MLEs to include a CG statement (CGS) in the annual 
financial statements, which shall include two sections, the first section focusing on 
compliance with the Code and the mechanisms undertaken, whilst the second 
section addressing non- compliance. Moreover, the CGS shall be validated by 
auditors.  
 
2.2 The Comply-or-Explain Approach 
 
Inwinkl et al. (2014) posited that at the heart of the EU’s CG framework, which was 
introduced by Directive 2006/46/EC is the CoE approach. As a result of the 
transposition of EU directives into national law, the approach of CoE became 
evident in all EU member states as an obligatory disclosure rule of every CG code 
(Caspar, 2016). The CoE approach was originally put forward by the Cadbury 
Report of 1992 in the UK, which provided the first CG code and since then acted as 
an international benchmark of such practice (Keay, 2014). The purpose of the CoE 
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approach is to invite and encourage companies to comply with all the principles of 
the applicable CG code, but whenever they are not able to abide by certain 
provisions for one reason or another, companies are not expected to comply (Seidl et 
al., 2013). In fact, the FRC (2018) suggests that a deviation from complying with a 
provision could be reasonable in specific settings based on a series of factors such as 
the size, history, complexity and structure of a company. The CoE has been 
designed to allow some flexibility to companies and to challenge the rigid hard law, 
acknowledged in the rigorous ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach, which seems unrealistic 
for the practice of CG (Kraakman et al., 2004). 
 
As mentioned, Inwinkl et al. (2014) claims that the application of the CoE approach 
can only be fruitful if maintained by blue-ribbon reporting, where non-compliant 
companies are required to provide sufficient and appropriate explanation for why 
they failed to conform with the provisions of the code. In this regard, Inwinkl et al. 
(2014) suggest that a proper explanation should provide (1) acceptable information 
about the areas of non-compliance, (2) an appropriate rationale for the non-
conformity and (3) the actions the company is taking to solve the departure. Thus, 
the CoE approach contributes to increasing transparency and disclosure of how a 
company is governed (Sergakis, 2015). It also intends to “empower shareholders to 
make an informed evaluation as to whether non-compliance is justified, given the 
company's circumstance” (Keay, 2014) as ultimately the primary objective of CG is 
the protection of the investor’s interest. 
 
Having said that, Keay (2014) also points out that shareholders tend to lack 
participation with respect to the limited monitoring of the CoE approach and stick to 
the traditional channels of information such as the annual financial statements for 
decision making. On the other hand, studies show that certain companies are taking 
advantage of the flexibility of the approach by complying superficially with the set 
principles. Thus, both the unchallenging investor and the exploiting company are 
undermining the primary objective of the CoE principle.  
 
2.5  Corporate Transparency 
 
Over the years, a number of varying definitions for the concept of CT have been put 
forward by several researchers. For example, finance and accounting researchers 
define the concept as “the availability of specific information to those outside 
publicly traded firms” (Bushman et al., 2004) and researchers of organisational 
behaviour describe it as “leader behaviors that are aimed at promoting trust through 
disclosures that include openly sharing information and expressions of the leader’s 
true thoughts and feelings” (Walumbwa et al., 2011), thus indicating that the 
concept of transparency does not exist or operate merely in a particular field. 
 
Despite the various approaches to explain the concept, it appears that there are some 
common surrounding aspects, firstly being that CT relates to information. In this 
regard, Fung (2014) argues that information is vital for investors to be able to make 
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well-informed judgments of the risk and rewards of a particular investment. 
Secondly, CT is deemed to be a perception of the information being received, such a 
perception can be highly influenced by an entity’s information sharing performance 
(Schnackenberg and Tomilson, 2016) and thirdly is the quality of information made 
available (Bushman et al., 2004). 
 
Schnackenberg and Tomilson (2016) mentioned three distinct dimensions which 
contribute to the general perception of CT by improving stakeholder confidence in 
the quality of information being received, namely (1) disclosures, (2) clarity and (3) 
accuracy. Haely and Palepu (2001) define corporate disclosures as a means of 
communicating company performance and governance to the outside stakeholders. 
The concept of corporate disclosures entails information to be freely and openly 
distributed in order to be treated as transparent while warranting the availability of 
relevant information thereof. 
 
Farvaque et al. (2011) mention two important distinctions. The first is that between 
financial and non-financial corporate disclosures. The former generally relates to 
information about the financial performance and position of a company included in 
the financial statements whereas the latter mainly involves information about the 
company’s social and CG. The second distinction is that between mandatory and 
voluntary disclosures. Mandatory disclosures relate to what is required by laws and 
regulations while voluntary disclosure is generally supplementary information, 
which is even more expected in today’s contemporary world.  
 
A company can increase its level of disclosure by disclosing further volumes of 
information in more frequent intervals through the use of open information systems 
on the one hand or it can reduce it through keeping secrets (Schnackenberg and 
Tomilson, 2014). Most of the time, secrets are linked with negative connotations:, 
however, there are times where secrets are considered to be legitimate and ethical 
within the parameters of confidentiality and necessary for sustaining the competitive 
advantage of a firm, such as product ingredients. Nonetheless, the intended 
concealment of information from external stakeholders is considered both 
illegitimate and unethical (Anand and Rosen, 2008; Bennis and O’Toole, 2009). 
Another pivotal dimension of CT is clarity.  
 
Schnackenberg and Tomilson (2014) define clarity as the degree of rationality and 
directness of the information shared by organisations. In this context, Winkler 
(2000) explained that companies are expected to deliver clearer information so as to 
reflect transparency while Street and Meister (2004) emphasised that such 
information must be understandable. Wolfe and Putler (2002) explained that 
companies could influence and communicate more clearly with stakeholders by 
delivering the message which is fit for their knowledge, interests and requirements, 
avoiding any unnecessary ambiguous linguistics and formality. Lastly, accuracy is 
considered to have an essential role in enhancing CT and preventing corporate 
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scandals (Akhigbe and Martin, 2006). Information is required to be valid (Bushmanl 
et al., 2004) and reliable (Williams, 2005) in order to be transparent. 
 
Given the volatility of today’s financial markets and the increase in scrutiny, 
transparency is no longer viewed as a luxury but has become a necessity in a system 
of governance (Borgia, 2005). Borgia (2005) continues to explain that CT may not 
lead to instant corporate success, but the absence of which may be a burden on the 
company’s performance and reputation and yet some companies may choose to set 
aside such requirements. In this regard, Bennis and O’Toole (2009) suggested a 
process involving a number of stages or practices that a company should incorporate 
in its CG framework in order to develop the concept of CT and improve the 
management of the firm. Figure 1 provides an illustration of this process. 
 
3. Research Methodology  
 
In order to achieve the objectives of this research study, a predominantly qualitative 
mixed methodology was adopted. Primary data was obtained from two different 
sources. Initially, semi-structured face-to-face interviewees were carried out. 
Interview questions were directed towards two interviewee categories: (1) MLEs 
representatives and (2) Big 4 audit firms representatives, with the aim of  obtaining 
varying views from different professionals. In total, thirteen interviews were 
conducted, nine of which were carried out with MLEs representatives and the 
remaining four with representatives of audit firm. The interview schedule prepared 
for the purpose of this study comprised a combination of closed-ended and open-
ended questions. It was aimed towards equity MLCs and Corporate Governance 
Experts (‘CGEs’). A five-point Likert scale, with ‘1’ being strongly disagree and ‘5’ 
being strongly agree, was used for the closed-ended questions 
 
Figure 1. The process of developing the concept of corporate transparency in 
corporate governance 
 
Source: Adapted from Bennis and O’Toole (2009). 
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To further support this study, we also conducted a detailed examination of the CGS 
of MLEs for three consecutive years, between 2015 and 2017. As at 23rd August 
2018, the Malta Stock Exchange (MSE) consisted of 23 equity listed entities: three 
of these entities were admitted to the MSE in 2017 or subsequent to this year . In 
total, the examination was conducted on 61 annual reports. The focus of such 
examination was on the adequacy of explanations disclosed in the non-compliance 
section of such statements. 
 
4. Findings and Discussion 
 
4.1 The Maltese Regulatory Framework 
 
(i) Is the CGS a sufficient mechanism for CT? 
 
As already mentioned constructing a regime of CT has become an elementary first 
step in attaining trust and confidence in today’s contemporary environment. All 
respondents (11) suggested that honest and “open communication” contribute 
significantly to the generation of stakeholder trust and confidence in public entities 
and consequently in the financial market. Research participants marginally agreed 
(  that a lack of CT and dialogue shatter shareholder/stakeholder trust as 
the concept of secrecy generally creates suspicions and conspiracy theories. 
Additionally, participants themselves emphasized that CT materialize only when a 
company has the ability to produce a system of fairness and respect, where the board 
and management of the company are willing to speak the truth to relevant 
stakeholders and vice versa.  
 
Moreover, if company directors and executives are inclined to listen to opposing 
arguments to those put on the table and guarantee to take notice of such viewpoints, 
they open the way for the creation of a transparent environment.  Such conduct is in 
accord with Walumbwa et al.’s (2011) definition of CT, where CT is defined as the 
extent to which information disseminates freely between the company and all its 
relevant stakeholders irrespective of their power of influence on the company’s 
performance. 
 
As stated in the literature, Bennis and O’Toole (2009) suggested a process involving 
a number of stages or practices that a company should incorporate in its CG 
framework in order to be able to produce a higher degree of transparency to improve 
disclosures. This process is being referred to in various parts of this discussion. 
Bennis and O’Toole (2009) recommended that a company should initiate this 
concept building by always telling the truth, while avoiding picturing situations 
rosier than they actually are with the primary aim to mislead the market. Therefore, 
the question arises whether MLEs are being transparent enough in their CGSs by 
telling the truth. 
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The examination of the CGSs revealed a number of issues relating to the adequacy 
of explanations provided. Although a number of companies are showing progress in 
their disclosures over the years, others significantly fail to do so. As also found in 
other foreign studies of Arcot et al. (2010) and Sergakis (2015), such failures mostly 
relate to explanations for non-compliance being inadequate, superficial or even non-
existent. In this context, the findings in this study confirm a number of previous 
recent studies also held in Malta such as Debono (2016).   
 
This study found that generally most companies do recognise their non-compliance 
with the principles or supporting provisions of the Code. However, as per the 
examples illustrated in Table 1, a number of companies simply identify such 
departure/s and fail to provide any valid reason or explanation for their actions, at 
times even attempting to justify this by depicting the other measures put in place 
instead of complying. 
 
Despite the free-hand report writing mechanism granted by the CoE approach 
embedded in the Code it is evident that in a number of instances, different 
companies tend to provide the same type of explanations, at times with slight 
variations. Table 2 presents some illustrations: 
 
Table 1. Justifications for non-compliance 
Grand Harbour Marina plc 2015: Provision 9.3 
“The Company does not have a formal mechanism in place as required by Code provision 
9.3 to resolve conflicts between minority shareholders and controlling shareholders and 
no such conflicts have arisen”. (p.19) 
Medserv plc 2016: Principle 3 
“In accordance with Code Provision 3.1, where the roles of the Chairman and the Chief 
Executive Director are combined, the Board should appoint one of the independent non-
executive directors to be the senior independent director. The Board has not appointed 
one of the independent non-executive directors to be the senior independent director”. 
(p.21) 
Plaza Centres plc 2017: Provision 6.4 
“With respect to Code Provision 6.4, the Board notes that professional 
development sessions were not organised for the period under review”. (p.15) 
HSBC Bank Malta plc 2015: Provision 4.2.7 
“Code Provision 4.2.7 recommends ‘the development of a succession policy for the future 
composition of the Board of Directors and particularly the executive component thereof, 
for which the Chairman should hold key responsibility’. The bank discloses that it never 
formalized a Board succession policy. However, in practice the REMNOM Committee is 
actively involved in the board succession, specifically in recommending the appointment 
of new members and also by evaluating any newly proposed appointees”. (p.34) 
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Table 1. Explanations with minor inter-company variations 
Plaza Centres plc 2016: Provision 9.4 
“Plaza does not have a policy in place to allow minority shareholders to present an issue 
to the Board”. (p.15) 
Malta International Airport plc 2017: Provision 9.4 
“The Company does not have a policy in place to allow minority shareholders to present 
an issue to the Board”. (p.22) 
GO plc 2015: Principle 3 
“As explained in Principle 3 in Section B, the Board is composed entirely of non-executive 
Directors. Notwithstanding this, it is considered that the Board, as composed, provides for 
sufficiently balanced skills and experience to enable it to discharge its duties and 
responsibilities effectively. In addition, no cases of conflict of interest are foreseen”. 
(p.32) 
Malta Properties Company plc 2015: Principle 3 
“As explained in Principle 3 in Section B, the Board is composed entirely of non-executive 
Directors. Notwithstanding this, it is considered that the Board, as composed, provides for 
sufficiently balanced skills and experience to enable it to discharge its duties and 
responsibilities effectively. In addition, no cases of conflict of interest are foreseen”. 
(p.16) 
 
Table 2. Explanations with no intra-company variations 
RS2 Software plc 2015: Provision 4.2.7 
“The Code recommends the development of a succession policy for the future composition 
of the Board of Directors. The Company does not consider this principle to be applicable 
to it on the basis that appointment of directors is a matter which is reserved exclusively to 
the Company’s shareholders (except as specified herein)”. (p.31) 
RS2 Software plc 2016: 
“The Code recommends the development of a succession policy for the future composition 
of the Board of Directors. The Company does not consider this principle to be applicable 
to it on the basis that appointment of directors is a matter which is reserved exclusively to 
the Company’s shareholders (except as specified herein)”. (p.13) 
RS2 Software plc 2017: 
“The Code recommends the development of a succession policy for the future composition 
of the Board of Directors. The Company does not consider this principle to be applicable 
to it on the basis that appointment of directors is a matter which is reserved exclusively to 
the Company’s shareholders (except as specified herein)”. (p.40) 
 
Furthermore, similarities are also evident with companies continuing not to adhere to 
a principle or provision of the Code, often providing the same exact explanations 
from year to year. Table 3 gives some examples of this. This could indicate that few 
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companies are trying to solve such departures, and also that little, if any, effort is 
being made to improve compliance. 
 
Albeit the fact that research participants did agree (  that the CoE approach 
for the CGS requires sufficient and appropriate explanations to be effective, it is 
clear that some MLEs are in practice not bothered to provide such explanations and 
improve the situation.  At the same time, a general denial persists with respect to any 
link between such low-quality explanations and a lack of CT. This is also indicative 
of corporate agents such as directors and managers being more intent on paying “lip 
service” to CG through politically correct explanations to complement their needs 
rather than telling the truth. This is an illustration of the agency problem.  With such 
attitudes towards the CGS it can hardly be claimed that such a statement conveys a 
proper reflection of CT within the local context and therefore further guidance to 
MLEs may be required regarding the preparation of such a statement. 
 
(ii) Is the Code to be legally enforceable? 
 
As claimed by Inwinkil et al. (2014), CG and the CoE approach are perceived to do 
their trick only if supported by high-quality reporting. In this context, MLEs seem to 
be decently aware of what is expected of them, and yet the issue of a lack of 
explanations persists with companies evidently exploiting the flexibility provided by 
the CoE. Research participants were asked to provide the extent of their agreement 
to five statements relating to the CoE as illustrated in Figure 2. 
 
The findings of this study indicate that companies do acknowledge the fact that the 
CoE is the main characteristic of the Code which enables them not to be unduly 
burdened by regulations, as the two most agreed statements are that it provides a 
degree of flexibility (   and it manages to challenge the rigid hard law 
( . A number (5) of respondents stated that it allows them to justify 
themselves in light of the characteristics of their operations (5/13). Yet, the 
examination of the CGS confirms that despite having been given such flexibility, 
some MLEs remain reluctant to refrain from any sort of exploitation. 
 
One of the main objectives of the CoE approach is to contribute towards increasing 
CT and disclosure. The notion is to protect the interest of shareholders which could 
be threatened by the separation of ownership and control, as such an approach helps 
to empower them to make better-informed decisions. Fung (2014) supports this idea 
of empowerment and adds that, if used appropriately, CG could also be an effective 
investment valuation tool. Yet, the findings indicate ( that the lack of 
sophistication and the financial illiteracy of most Maltese shareholders, particularly 
the minority ones, too often render them uninterested or even incompetent in 
exerting any pressures for CT or any other CG issues beyond the distribution of 
dividends. It is the majority shareholder who typically shows interest in such issues 
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and, as a result, overall shareholder monitoring may be lacking and undermining the 
whole concept. 
 
Figure 2. The comply-or-explain approach 
 
Source: Authors’ Compilation. 
 
Therefore, it is natural that these arguments give rise to the debate over whether the 
Code needs to be legally enforceable if it is to ensure adherence to regulations of CG 
CT best practices. Most respondents (8) indicated that MLEs would resist the legal 
enforceability of the Code) and that, therefore, one would need to proceed cautiously 
on this matter. On the one hand, legal enforceability of CG provisions could result in 
a one-size-fits-all effort which does not leave enough room for maneuvering in 
different companies in a dynamic and complex market.  In fact, two research 
participants pointed out that if the Code is compelled, it would merely drive 
companies in improving their CG and CT, but will possibly reduce their efforts to a 
symbolic box-ticking exercise.  Also, one emphasized that CG is a matter of 
“ethics” while pointing out that it would be better if a “name-and-shame policy” 
had to be adopted for defaulter rather than legally enforce the Code. 
 
On the other hand, it is clear from the literature (Baldacchino, 2007) that, within the 
Maltese CG culture, unless there is legal enforceability there will be too few 
adherents to best practices even if recommended by a CoE code. There is also the 
issue of the extent to which CG matters, most of which fall under the umbrella of 
corporate ethics, may be regulated directly and effectively by any laws. Translating 
into legislation such matters which are considered part of ethical morals may also be 
highly controversial. Therefore, legal enforceability of CG/CT matters may have the 
reverse effect to the legislators’ intent in that companies may attempt only to 
observe the letter, rather than the spirit, of the law.  
 
Taking both sides of the argument into consideration, one possible compromise that 
emerges is the introduction of structured requirements in a part of the CGS. By 
going through the answers to the structured questions stakeholders may come to 
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know clearly whether CG/CT requirements are being met. However, so as not to 
render the CGS as a mere box-ticking exercise any structured part could be followed 
by another semi-structured part made up of more open-ended questions, wherein the 
company may explain with some flexibility the extent to which it is adhering to 
CG/CT practices. 
 
4.2 The Dysfunctional Corporate Governance Practices and Corporate 
Transparency: The Links 
 
(i) Where is the line to be drawn between corporate confidentiality and 
transparency? 
The appropriate level of CT emanates from a balance between the stakeholders’ 
right to have information and the companies’ right to privacy with respect to 
confidential and sensitive matters. On the one hand, stakeholders have a legitimate 
right to receive detailed information which is transparent enough as to allow them to 
form a valid opinion on the past, present and future direction of the company. In this 
context, the Code (MFSA, 2011) recommends for MLEs to “give shareholders a 
clear and comprehensive picture of a company’s governance arrangements” (p.1) 
and to communicate effectively by providing “regular, timely, accurate, 
comprehensive and comparable” (p.15) information. On the other hand, companies’ 
right to privacy refers to their right to control the supply of information and 
disclosures in such a way that they retain confidential and sensitive material as a 
protection of their competitive advantage as claimed by the OECD (2015). 
 
In short, one may synthesise this as the dilemma between the two requisites of CT 
and corporate confidentiality, both essential for a business to be successful. Figure 3 
illustrates that there needs to be a line drawn between these two opposites. If such a 
line is not appropriately drawn, corporate secrecy will start to infringe on CT. 
Therefore, the main concern and responsibility of those in charge of CG are to 
ensure that such a line is legitimate and that no corporate secrecy infringement 
occurs. Becoming too focused on confidentiality may result in unneeded secrecy 
with its negative implications. On the other hand, even focusing on transparency 
may result in undue damage to the company within its market in view of its 
overexposure.  
 
The findings of this study indicate that a number of MLEs may be finding it difficult 
to draw such a legitimate line. In fact, when faced with four different dysfunctional 
CG practices which were indicative of possible suppression of CT, a controversy 
arose among interviewees. While about half (6) recognised that such practices are 
possibly secretive, others (7) rationalised that they are not so but that, rather, they 
have more to do with the need for corporate confidentiality as further explained 
below. 
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Figure 3. The corporate dilemma 
 
Source: Authors’ Compilation. 
 
▪ Insufficiently detailed disclosures relating to director compensations  
When asked about the insufficient detailed disclosures relating to director 
compensations most participants (10) opposed any relation to a lack of CT. On the 
contrary, they attributed this to the perceived “commercial sensitivity” with respect 
to any information being published and the legal need for personal privacy, which 
are even more prevalent given the smallness of the state of Malta. A number (6) of 
participants felt deeply that given such smallness, it is safer for MLEs to limit this to 
an aggregate figure of remuneration. One interviewee deliberated that there is no 
“added value” in individualised disclosure but only in aggregate disclosure of 
remuneration, which on its part could be overseen by an appropriate remuneration 
committee.  
 
Conversely, a minority of research participants (3) acknowledged the possible link 
between the practice of aggregated remuneration and a lack of CT. They found such 
a practice as originating from the perceived need to conceal the amounts earned at 
the top level and their remuneration thereof. One interviewee mentioned that this 
practice is most evident in debt-listed companies, which are not subject to as much 
stakeholder scrutiny as equity-listed companies. One of these interviewees claimed 
that this practice is indeed dysfunctional but that such practice is on the decline.  
 
In this context, the examination of the annual reports revealed that in the CGSs for 
the three financial years ending 2015 to 2017, there were only nine cases of non-
compliance relating to the setting up of a remuneration committee. Moreover, 
despite the fact that the Code limits its requirement to an aggregated disclosure of 
remuneration and most of the interviewees considered that such aggregation is 
sufficient, there were still 25 cases over the three years where companies went 
beyond the Code requirements to disclose individualised remuneration. Companies 
providing such individualised remuneration information included Bank of Valletta 
plc, HSBC Bank Malta plc, MaltaPost plc and Plaza Centres plc. 
Corporate 
Transparency 
Corporate 
Confidentiality 
   Corporate Secrecy 
Over exposure 
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▪ Non-evaluation of the performance of the board 
With respect to the non-evaluation of the performance of the board of directors, most 
participants (9) maintained that there is probably little, if any, link between such 
non-evaluation and corporate attitudes against CT. Such links may, however, arise 
from the fact that an appreciable number of directors may not be willing to subject 
themselves to such an exercise. This might be because the results of this exercise 
may have adverse implications beyond the company performing such an evaluation. 
Malta is a country where many directors have multiple “positions” in different 
companies and where the place is “too small” for any undesirable results of the 
performance evaluation of the directors whether published or also not to become 
known elsewhere. It is evident that companies prefer to come to know about 
performance only informally and without any structure. Possibly the regulator 
requiring structures, such as a robust and detailed questionnaire, an interview, a 
review of the board minutes as well as the engagement of independent consultants, 
are the only ways for CT in this context to become implemented. 
 
▪ Inadequate explanations for non-compliance  
When asked about the inadequacy of explanations for non-compliance with the 
Code, responses were balanced as to whether there is a link between such 
explanations and the lack of CT with slightly more responses (7) to such no link. 
The main reason forwarded by those who stated that there is no such link is that the 
preparers of explanations have legitimately considered the competitiveness of the 
company. Furthermore, giving more detailed explanations would be dangerous as it 
would breach confidentiality. This study indicated that in Malta, a satisfactory level 
of confidentiality and the right accounting numbers were significantly more 
important than CT. Moreover, both an inappropriately structured Code and the 
Maltese culture commonly override any consideration towards more transparency.  
On the other hand, participants maintaining that there is a link (6) between CT and 
inadequate explanations emphasised that a number of company boards were ready to 
“skew the picture” in order to stick to “political correctness”. The latter attitudes 
lead such directors to consider and evaluate each and every word and resort to a 
“copy-and-paste” from similar reports method.  
 
▪ Communication with shareholders and the market 
Regarding the lack of communication with shareholders and the market and its link 
to company attitudes against CT a minority (5) of research participants all company 
representatives, emphasised that there is no such lack of communication. 
Communication with shareholders includes not only the AGM but also company 
announcements,  company’s newsletters,  the annual report,  e-mails and meetings 
with the Malta Association of Small Shareholders (MASS). Therefore, in their 
opinion there was no question of any link with CT. 
 
On the contrary, most participants (8) stated that a lack of communication with 
shareholders and the market do exists with most of these (6) also pointing out that 
there is a link to attitudes against CT. In their view, adverse CT attitudes were 
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evident from the lack of meaningful communication with all shareholders 
particularly in the AGM which they described as often being “stage-managed”, a 
“fancy reception” and of “inconvenience to directors”.  A number of interviewees 
(3) referred to the implication of there being no CT by the fact that a number of 
directors do not feel any sense of accountability. A common cause of the situation is 
that many shareholders are not sophisticated enough to exert pressure on their 
directors at the AGM, which they may view as entertainment.  
 
One auditor pointed out that in his/her experience, the link between a company’s 
attitudes and a lack of CT becomes more evident whenever a company is not 
performing well and even more when in distress. On the other hand, a company 
enjoying boom performance is much more prone to be transparent. Two other 
participants (2) claimed that although a lack of communication exists, it can’t be 
directly linked to a lack of CT. In their view, such a lack of communication exists 
because of shareholder indifference, thus rendering it unviable for companies to 
invest in more disclosures than at present. 
 
As seen in the literature and from the various findings of this study, two major 
pillars in developing the concept of CT are the readiness to encounter uncomfortable 
situations and to admit mistakes – two pillars which, unfortunately, seem to be frail 
in the Maltese corporate culture. 
 
4.3 Possible Reasons for Lack of Corporate Transparency 
 
(i) Is the regulator to be more involved? 
When asked how valid the Code is in encouraging good CG practices, few research 
participants (2) highlighted the detail that issues relating to CG arise not specifically 
because of the Code itself, but more as a result of its weak implementation. This 
explains that the current situation considerably lacks the involvement of the 
regulatory authority. More precisely, the MFSA is not placing much pressure on 
those companies failing to comply with the Code. In particular, the regulator 
generally does not review the substance of the disclosures provided in the CGS. In 
the experience of some of the company representatives (3), very few MFSA 
inspections have been held in this context and even where inspection does 
materialise, regulator feedback is often delayed, and hence rarely relevant. 
Unfortunately, few interviewees (2) agreed that the MFSA tends to focus more on 
somewhat trivial matters such as requiring the provision of the annual report not 
through a hyperlink. This situation could be permitting companies to provide 
superficial disclosures and withhold useful information from the users. 
 
In a similar vein, research participants highly agreed (  (Figure 4), that in order to 
improve CT, a stricter implementation of the existing regulatory framework is 
needed. Most (8) claimed that the MFSA could take up a more “proactive 
supervision” stance. In these circumstances, the Code needs to be clearer so that 
inspectors will be able to act where appropriately required. An effective regulator 
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needs to be provided with appropriate resources and while audit firms could lend a 
helping hand to the regulator, it ultimately remains the regulator’s responsibility to 
inspect properly. 
 
Figure 4. Improving corporate transparency 
 
Source: Authors’ Compilation. 
 
More regulatory involvement is probably required, not only with respect to 
monitoring and inspection, but also in terms of better guidance to MLEs in preparing 
their CGS. Such increased involvement does not necessarily lead to stricter fines but 
may also involve the introduction of policies such as a name-and-shame one. With 
the increased stakeholder use of social media sources, a name-and-shame policy 
could render companies highly concerned with potential damages that any regulator 
announcement in their regard could have on the reputation, credibility, financial 
support, trust and competitive advantages of the company. A stronger level of 
regulation does not have to be overstretched and will not be so if the focus is on 
improving communication lines between the regulator and MLEs. In this context, 
provisional guidelines on CG matters such as transparency and confidentiality could 
go a long way. 
 
(ii) Are stakeholders contributing to less corporate transparency? 
The shareholder who exercises his own right as the owner of the company can exert 
significant influence on the company’s CG. However, the indications are (5) that 
most shareholders do not value the information provided in the CGS and any 
analysis therein is carried out either by institutional shareholders or financial 
intermediaries. A related issue is that even if they are willing to, most shareholders 
are not themselves competent and sophisticated enough to analyse the financial 
statements. Nowadays, the financial statements persistently include much more 
complexities and technicalities which increases the difficulty of interpretation 
especially for the individual shareholder who is less familiar with finance and tend 
to be only interested in the distribution of dividends. One research participant 
declared that the CGS together with the Chairman’s and the CEO’s statements could 
become even more popular than the financial statements themselves as sources of 
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reference to individual shareholders. Likewise, another interviewee pointed out that 
the CGS is one of the simplest in the annual report, she/he still doubts whether 
stakeholders actually appreciate its value enough. 
 
Considering this lack of interest and competence, such statements may easily turn 
out to be a waste of resources if left unread by most shareholders. After all, it is of 
little use for companies to improve the level of CT if doing so leaves hardly leaving 
any impact on most corporate stakeholders. In this connection, the MASS may play 
its part in helping its members achieve better training and understanding and 
possibly acting as an intermediate for them in dialogues with companies. Figure 4 
shows that having stronger shareholder associations could be the way forward for 
improving current CT situation locally.  Research participants (8) pointed out that 
collective action is much more effective than individual initiative.  
 
For such actions to become possible, it is essential for minority shareholder 
associations to place more importance on the protection of shareholders’ interests 
without sharing the common current disinterested mindset (i.e., mostly focused on 
the distribution of dividends) of most minority shareholders and prioritises the 
educational aspect. Companies may also play their part to encourage both internal 
and external stakeholders to participate more in CG/CT matters. In this context, 
Bennis and O’ Toole’s (2009) process includes encouraging stakeholders to speak 
the truth with high ranking individuals within their company. In the Maltese 
corporate context, this study indicates that companies often discourage shareholders 
from participating by measures such as allowing too short a time for questioning in 
the AGM or using too technical a language for the ordinary minority shareholder to 
be engaged.  
 
(iii) How relevant is the small state environment? 
This study indicates that within the Maltese small state environment, corporate 
disclosures may lead to wider damages to those in charge of CG as the corporate 
community is smaller and most people are easily accessible and know each other. 
This is also in line with the literature. Furthermore, corporate competitors may be 
watching company developments more closely and intensely and therefore rendering 
directors more prone to withholding information. Probably, such an innate issue 
cannot be easily resolved at least not until there is more integration between Maltese 
industries and its European counterparties. 
 
4.4 Possible Implications on the Corporate Governance of Maltese Listed 
Entities 
 
(i) Will investor trust be diminished? 
As stated earlier, owing to the volatility in the international financial markets, the 
need and demand for the proper level of CT have been on the rise. Corporate 
information and disclosure are considered to be integral components for both 
existing and potential investors in their investment decision making. CT and a more 
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robust disclosure regime which demand accurate and detailed information on 
financial matters and other non-financial matters, such as the entity’s goals for the 
future, related party transactions, conflicts of interests and governance structures are 
expected. This would enable investors, along with other market participants, to much 
more accurately evaluate the position and activities of the company.  As such, this 
would lead to the generation of more trust and confidence and even facilitate 
external financing to the company. In this context, research participants agreed 
marginally (x ̅=3.77) that a lack of CT may result in diminished investor trust in the 
entity and the financial market. Most participants (7) claimed that the investor is 
required to be treated fairly and provided with all relevant information required to 
make informed decisions. If this is not the case, one cannot expect that the 
existing/potential investor to be “totally confident” and provide the necessary 
support. 
 
On the contrary, some participants (6) clarified that in Malta such diminished 
investor trust could possibly not take place since the Maltese investor’s trust in the 
market is mainly driven by “high rates of return”, “dividends”, “bonds income” 
and “shares price volatility” rather than the lack of CT or anything related to CG. A 
few of them (2) pointed out that the possible reason behind this deficiency of 
awareness about the CG concept maybe the fact that, until today, every bond issued 
has been paid back and none of the MLEs has failed. Therefore, investors do not 
easily “get alarmed”. However, such a lack of sensing alarm as long as they receive 
their return may prove itself to be dangerous. 
 
Therefore, in order to restrain a closed and opaque corporate culture which usually 
lead to increased negative consequences, the annual report possibly require to 
commission more importance on the CG aspects beyond the financial ones. 
Hopefully, minority shareholders will, in time, be better financially educated and 
further appreciate both aspects and stop limiting themselves to what directly 
concerns them. 
 
(ii) Will false information and rumours be spread in the market? 
The findings of this study demonstrate a marginal agreement (   that  any 
lack of information, direct dialogue and CT may easily create suspicions even when 
circumstances do not warrant this. Moreover, such lack may also result in the spread 
of false rumours in the market as it may act as a motive for people to draw their own 
conclusions.  
 
This practice can negatively impact both the company which is not disclosing the 
required detailed information and its stakeholders. External stakeholders such as 
investors and creditors may end up being misled into taking the wrong decisions. 
The company’s reputation, which may have taken a long time to build, may easily 
become susceptible to destruction, thus leading to the creation of further investment 
barriers. Furthermore, at a point in time companies involved in any market rumours 
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will have to react to set the “record straight” subjecting themselves to unnecessary 
costs which could be avoided through appropriate foresight.  
 
CT and information sharing should push the company not only towards correcting 
wrong impressions but also to be more proactive and generate market confidence. 
Indeed, in the real-world information may flow quickly but not necessarily 
smoothly. The management of a company usually have greater access to information 
than its owners and therefore are more aware of the functioning of the business. The 
impact of CT is that of minimising such information asymmetry. The more 
companies manage to be transparent without breaching any legitimate confidential 
matters, the more they push towards problem-solving and ensure that any wrong 
doing if committed in the past will not be repeated in the future. 
 
5. Conclusion  
 
This study concludes that, at present, CT is not sufficiently entrenched within the 
CG culture of several MLEs, as the latter are still facing difficulties in achieving and 
maintaining a legitimate balance between corporate confidentiality and transparency. 
In this regard, the Maltese Code may be more supportive by providing more detailed 
and clearer guidelines on CT. In particular, the Code does not specify how the CGS 
may properly reflect the appropriate level of CT. This is evidently contributing to 
the tendency of some MLEs to render the CGS as a merely politically correct 
necessity and only complying to an artificial symbolically level, despite not being 
strangers to what it is and what it should entail. 
 
In addition, insufficient regulatory enforcement maybe another major factor 
contributing to a lack of CT. In this context, more regulatory involvement is clearly 
required in terms of monitoring and inspections. Such increased enforcement may 
do away with inadequate explanations for non-compliance with the provisions of the 
Code. Furthermore, this study concludes that shareholders, in particular minority 
shareholder, often lack the necessary level of sophistication and financial education 
to render them competent to challenge those charged with CG. The tendency is 
therefore for them to be merely interested in the return of their investment. As a 
small island state, Malta may also be contributing to the reluctance of corporate 
directors to be more transparent. 
 
The implications of the above are that both the regulator and the regulated need to be 
taking the appropriate action as otherwise one cannot ensure adequate investor 
confidence and protection against future corporate scandals. 
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